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Analytical Formulas for Risk Assessment for a Class of 
Problems where Risk Depends on Three Interrelated Variables  
ABSTRACT 
We derive general analytical formulas for assessing risks in a problem domain where the 
risk depends on three interrelated variables. More specifically, we derive general analytical 
formulas for propagating beliefs in a network where three binary variables, A, B and C, are 
related to a fourth binary variable Z through an ‘AND’ relationship. In addition, we assume that 
variables A, B and C are interrelated in that a change in one variable may affect the value of each 
of the other two. The analytical formulas derived in this article determine the overall belief and 
plausibility that Z is true or not true, given that we have beliefs on variables A, B and/or C.  
To demonstrate the importance of the general results, we use the results to develop 
models applicable to three real-world situations. The first model can aid external auditors in 
assessing the quality of an audit client’s internal audit function to determine the extent to which 
the internal auditor’s work can be relied on in the conduct of a financial audit while the second 
can aid in assessing the risk of impaired auditor independence when conducting a financial 
statement audit. The third model can be used to assess the risk of management fraud in financial 
reporting. Assessment of such risks is of critical importance to external auditors, regulators, and 
the investing public. Analytical formulas to help address these types of important business and 
economic problems have not been available prior to these derivations.  
 
Key Words: Risk Assessment, Belief Propagation, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions, 
Interacting Variables, Fraud Risk Assessment Model, Auditor’s Independent Risk Assessment 
Model, Internal Audit Function Assessment Model 
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Analytical Formulas for Risk Assessment for a Class of 
Problems where Risk Depends on Three Interrelated Variables 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the business world, failure to recognize and assess risks can result in significant costs 
to the public. In a financial statement audit, for example, it is important that the auditor assess 
the risk of financial statement fraud. However, as evidenced from the many cases of fraudulent 
financial reporting, auditors face significant challenges in assessing such risks adequately.1 The 
inability to assess fraud risk adequately has cost the auditing profession and the investing public 
billions of dollars. This is evidenced by the demise of one of the world’s largest accounting and 
auditing firms, Arthur Andersen, and the failures of companies such as Enron and WorldCom. 
According to Cotton [5], shareholders lost $460 billion in the five fraud cases of Enron, Global 
Crossing, Qwest, WorldCom, and Tyco alone. The cost is much more if the indirect costs of 
fraudulent financial reporting behaviors are considered, such as the loss of public trust in the 
auditing profession and reduced confidence in the capital market system that is the engine of the 
global economy. 
The auditing profession has been aware of the need to identify and assess the risk of 
financial statement fraud for some time. In 2002 the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) published Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit [3], which requires a pre-audit assessment of the risk of 
fraud by the independent auditor as well as a continuous assessment update as a financial 
                                                 
1 For example, Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest, WorldCom, and Tyco. See [5] for more 
examples. 
 2
statement audit progresses. This statement indicates that three conditions generally are present 
when fraud occurs: [3, ¶7]: 
 1. management or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure which 
provides a reason to commit fraud, 
 2. circumstances exist that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated, such as 
the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of management to override 
existing controls, and  
3. those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act.  
Logically however, if any one, two, or all of these conditions are absent then fraud should not 
occur. These three factors are known as “fraud triangle” factors [17]. 
The main purpose of this article is to derive general analytical formulas for assessing 
risks in a problem domain where the risk depends on three interrelated variables such as in the 
case of fraud. This problem context is quite general and applies to several other important 
business risk- assessment contexts such as auditor independence and the quality of the internal 
audit function. 
For example, lack of auditor independence is a critical risk requiring assessment. Auditor 
independence risk is defined as the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the extent that 
they are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise or can reasonably be expected to compromise, 
an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions about the financial statements of a specific 
client [9]. In testimony before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Ralph 
Whitworth, Managing Member, Relational Investors LLC argued that “[A]uditor independence 
goes to the very essence of our capital markets, and its linked inextricably to the efficiencies of 
our capitalist system" [18]. Turner et al. [15, 34] argue that the risk of compromised 
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independence depends on three interrelated variables: Incentives, Opportunity and Integrity. 
These three factors are similar to fraud triangle factors discussed earlier.  
Another example of the general three-variable problem is assessing the risk of the 
internal audit function not being of high quality. Internal auditing is a key function within most 
large organizations that is intended to monitor and improve the operating effectiveness and 
efficiencies of the organization it serves. Krishnamoorthy [10] has analyzed the quality 
[‘strength’] of the internal audit function as a function of three interrelated variables: 
Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. Again, one can use the general formulas 
developed in this article to assess the risk of the internal audit function not being of high quality. 
Usually, the degree to which factors affecting a specific type of risk are present or absent 
is not known with certainty. Thus, we use the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of belief functions 
to model the uncertainties associated with the items of evidence pertaining to these variables [19, 
36]. Under the D-S theory of belief functions, risk is defined by the plausibility function [32]. In 
this article, we derive analytical formulas for propagating beliefs in a network of four interacting 
binary variables; a risk variable and three other interrelated variables that can affect the risk 
variable. As part of our derivation, we use the Shenoy and Shafer [23, 24] approach for 
propagating beliefs through the network to derive the general formulas. 
To illustrate our solution for this class of risk assessment problems, we derive general 
analytical formulas for propagating beliefs in a network where three binary variables, A, B and 
C, are related to a fourth binary variable Z through a logical ‘AND’ relationship. In addition, we 
assume that variables A, B and C may be interrelated in that a change in one variable may affect 
the value of each of the other two. The analytical formulas derived determine the overall beliefs 
and plausibilities that Z is true or not true, given that we have beliefs about variables A, B and C. 
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As noted above, such formulas provide analytical models for assessing risks in several important 
real world problems as discussed in Section IV.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section introduces belief 
functions while Section III develops the analytical formulas by combining seven sets of belief 
functions using Shenoy and Shafer [24]. Section IV discusses three real world applications of the 
general formulas in assessing fraud risk in financial reporting, assessing the auditor’s 
independence risk in assurance services, and assessing the strength or quality of the internal 
audit function by the external auditor. Section V provides the overall study conclusions. Finally, 
Appendix A provides the proof of Theorem 1, and Appendix B provides the proof of Corollary 1 
proposed in Section III. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF BELIEF 
FUNCTIONS 
The D-S theory of belief functions is based on the work of Dempster [6] during the 1960s 
and the work of Shafer during the 1970s [19, see also 20, 21, 22, 23]. In fact, the D-S theory of 
belief functions is a generalization of Bayesian theory. To clarify the distinction between the two 
frameworks, let us consider a variable X with q possible mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets 
of values2: x1, x2, …, xq. This set of values defines the frame of X. Let us denote this frame by 
the symbol ΘX = {x1, x2, … xq}. Suppose we do not know the true state of variable X, i.e., we do 
not know what value X will take. In such a situation, under probability framework we assign 
probability mass, P(xi),  to each single element, xi, of the frame  ΘX in such a way that sum of 
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P(x )∑ =1, where 1≥P(xi)≥0. Under the DS theory, we 
assign belief mass to all the possible subsets of the frame, ΘX, i.e., to all the singletons, all the 
subsets of two, all the subsets of three, and so on to the entire frame ΘX. The belief mass 





∑ , where 1≥m(Y)≥0. By definition, the belief mass on the empty set is 
zero. i.e., m(∅) = 0. Shafer [19] calls this set of belief masses the basic probability assignment 
function; we will call it the m-values or belief mass function or simply the mass function. As one 
can see from the above definition of the mass function, the D-S theory reduces to a probability 
framework if m-values for all the subsets except the singletons are zero. 
In more conceptual terms, the basic algebra of belief functions is relatively simple and 
begins with developing beliefs about an assertion or issue based on items of evidence pertaining 
to that assertion or issue. For example, when evaluating a general assertion, say assertion A, 
evidence E1 may provide, in general, some support that assertion A is true, i.e., ‘a’ is true, and 
some support that A is not true, i.e., ‘~a’ is true. In terms of the mass function we can write these 
assessments as mE1({a}) and mE1({~a}) respectively. Lack of knowledge about whether A is true 
or not true is represented by mE1({a,~a}), such that the sum of the three m-values is one. i.e., 
mE1({a}) + mE1({~a}) + mE1({a,~a}) = 1.  
                                                                                                                                                             
2 We use the upper case letter for the name of the variable and lower case letter for its values. 
For example, if Z is the name of a binary variable then ‘z’, and ‘~z’, respectively, represent the 
two possible values of Z being true or false. The frame of a variable is denoted by the symbol Θ 
with the variable as a subscript. For example, the frame of variable Z is denoted by ΘΖ = {z, ~z}. 
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Belief Functions 
The belief in a subset, say Y, represents the total belief that Y is true and is the sum of the 
m-values defined at Y and the m-values defined on any subsets contained in Y. Mathematically, 





 For our example above, the belief that assertion A is true based on evidence E1 is given 
by BelE1({a}) = mE1({a}), the belief that assertion A is not true is given by BelE1({~a}) = 
mE1({~a}), and the lack of belief about assertion A is given by BelE1({a,~a}) = mE1({a,~a}) . A 
belief of one in a statement represents certainty similar to a value of one for probability in a 
statement. However, a belief of zero in a statement represents ignorance while a zero probability 
represents impossibility. 
Plausibility Functions 
The plausibility in a subset, say Y, determines the maximum possible belief one could 
assign to Y based on the current evidence and the assumption that all the future evidence will be 





For our example of assertion A described earlier, the plausibility that ‘a’ is true based on 
the evidence E1 is given by PlE1({a}) = mE1({a}) + mE1({a,~a}), and the plausibility that ‘~a’ is 
true is given by PlE1({~a}) = mE1({~a}) +  mE1({a,~a}). 
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Dempster’s Rule of Combination 
Dempster’s rule [19] is used to combine independent items of evidence from multiple 
sources. For combining two sets of mass functions defined on the same frame, one can write 
Dempster’s rule as: 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Y Y Y Y Y= =
m(Y) = m (Y )m (Y ) / K, where K = 1  m (Y )m (Y )
∅∩ ∩
−∑ ∑ . 
K represents the renormalization constant defined above as one minus the conflict. 
To illustrate the concepts, let us consider our example of assertion A and the evidence E1 
that yield a set of m-values represented by mE1({a}), mE1({~a}), and mE1({a,~a}). Consider a 
second source of evidence, E2, with the following mass function: mE2(a), mE2(~a), and 
mE2({a,~a}). The combined mass function using Dempster’s rule is given as:  
 mE12({a})= [mE1({a})mE2({a}) + mE1({a})mE2({a,~a}) + mE1({a,~a})mE2({a})]/KE12, 
 mE12({~a}) = [mE1({~a})mE2({~a}) + mE1({~a})mE2({a,~a}) + mE1({a,~a})mE2({~a})]/KE12,  
 mE12({a,~a}) =  [mE1({a,~a})mE2({a,~a})]/KE12, 
where KE12 is the renormalization constant defined as: 
KE12 = 1 – [mE1({a})mE2({~a}) + mE1({~a})mE2({a})]. 
The second term in KE12 represents conflict between the two sets of beliefs pertaining to 
assertion A. 
III. ANALYTICAL FORMULAS 
In this section, we develop the analytical formulas for propagating beliefs in the network 
of binary variables shown in Figure 1 from variables A, B and C to the variable Z. Variables A, 
B and C are related to Z through a logical ‘AND’ relationship. In addition, in our derivation of 
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the general formula we consider two-way relationships among the variables A, B and C. In other 
words, variable A is connected to B through a relationship depicted by R1, B is connected to C 
through a relationship depicted by R2, and C is connected to A through a relationship depicted by 
R3. These relationships are bidirectional and are elaborated later in this section. We consider one 
item of evidence for each variable A, B and C as depicted in Figure 1. However, one can extend 
the present approach to the case where there is more than one item of evidence for each variable 
by using Dempster’s rule to combine the multiple items of evidence for each variable as 
described in [28]. 
-----   Figure 1 about here   ----- 
As mentioned earlier, we use the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions to represent 
the uncertainties in the strength of evidence pertaining to individual variables A, B and C. Let us 
consider the following set of mass functions to represent the beliefs at these variables: 
The beliefs at variable A:   mA({a}) = 
+
Am , mA({~a}) = Am
− , mA({a,~a}) = Am
Θ . (1) 
The beliefs at variable B:   mB({b}) = 
+
Bm , mB({~b}) = Bm
− , mB({b,~b}) = Bm
Θ . (2) 
The beliefs at variable C:   mC({c}) =
+
Cm , mC({~c}) = Cm
− , mC({c,~c}) = Cm
Θ . (3) 
The interrelationships between A and B, between B and C, and between A and C, are 
assumed to be of the following form: 
Relationship between A and B: mAB({ab,~a~b}) = r1, mAB({ab,a~b,~ab,~a~b}) = 1− r1. (4) 
Relationship between B and C: mBC({bc,~b~c}) = r2, mBC({bc,b~c,~bc,~b~c}) = 1− r2. (5) 
Relationship between A and C: mAC({ac,~a~c}) = r3, mAC({ac, a~c, ~ac, ~a~c}) = 1− r3. (6) 
Various m-values and the interrelationships are defined in Table 1. 
-----   Table 1 about here   ----- 
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These relationships imply that if one variable, say A, is true then variable B also is true 
with a belief given by the corresponding strength of the relationship represented by r1 and 
variable C is true with a belief given by the corresponding strength of the relationship 
represented by r2, assuming there is no other belief defined for variables B and C. In addition, if 
one variable is false then the other variables also are false, again with a belief given by the 
corresponding strength of the relationships. The values of the strength of each of the 
relationships, ri’s, lie between zero and 1 where a zero value means there is no relationship 
between the two variables. A value of one for a relationship implies that if one variable is true 
with a given degree of belief then the related variable also is true with the same degree of belief 
assuming that there is no other belief defined for the related variable. For example, if A is true 
with a belief of, say 0.9 (i.e., Bel({a}) = 0.9) and we assume that there is no relationship between 
B and C (i.e., r2 = 0) and there are no beliefs from any other source at B and C, then B will be 
true with a belief of 0.9 and C will be true with a belief of 0.9 if r1= 1 and r3= 1. Also, under the 
above condition (i.e., r1= 1 and r3= 1), if A is not true with a belief of, say 0.9 (i.e., Bel(~a) = 
0.9) then B will also be not true with a belief of 0.9, and C will not be true with a belief of 0.9. 
Such relationships are quite common in real world situations as discussed in Section IV 
in detail. For example, even though management of a company may appear to have high 
integrity, if incentives exist for management to benefit from misrepresenting financial 
information, their ethics may be compromised to the point of committing financial statement 
fraud to achieve those incentives. Similarly, if management’s integrity is compromised, then 
incentives and/or opportunities may be created to benefit from committing fraud. On the other 
hand, if there are no incentives to benefit from committing fraud or no opportunities available, 
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then management will behave appropriately and not commit fraud. These interrelationships can 
be modeled using the above relationships.   
The logical relationship ‘AND’ between Z and the variables A, B and C is expressed in 
terms of the following mass function (see [30] for details): 
 mZABC(ΘZABC) = 1.0. (7) 
where ΘZABC = {zabc, ~zab~c, ~za~bc, ~z~abc, ~za~b~c, ~z~ab~c, ~z~a~bc, ~z~a~b~c}. 
In the present problem, we have seven mass functions, three corresponding to the 
variables A, B and C, (i.e., mA, mB and mC) and four representing the interrelationships, mAB, 
mBC, mAC and mZABC, as given in (4)-(7). To derive the analytical formulas for the mass function 
at variable Z, we need to combine all seven mass functions and marginalize3 the result to 
variable Z: 
 mZ←ABC = (mA⊕mB⊕mC⊕mAB⊕mAC⊕mBC⊕mZABC)
↓Z
,  (8) 
where mZ←ABC represents the mass function at Z propagated from variables A, B and C, the 
symbol ⊕ denotes the combination of beliefs, i.e., mass functions, using Dempster’s rule, and the 
symbol ↓Z represents the process of marginalization of the combined mass function within the 
parenthesis to the frame of variable Z. We express these results through the following theorem. 
                                                 
3 The marginalization process in D-S theory is similar to the marginalization process in 
probability theory. For example, suppose we have a probability distribution over two variables A 
and B and we want the distribution over just one variable, say A. The second variable B can be 
eliminated by summing the probabilities over variable B to obtain the probability distribution 
over A. Similarly, under D-S theory, if we have a mass function defined over the joint space of 
variables A and B, then we can obtain the mass function defined just over variable A by 
summing the mass function over the variable B. 
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Theorem 1:  For a binary variable Z that is related to three other binary variables, A, B and C, 
through the logical relationship ‘AND’, and where the variables A, B and C are 
interrelated, the mass function propagated to Z from variables A, B and C is given 
by the following expressions: 
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Proof of Theorem 1: See Appendix A for the proof. 
By definition, the beliefs in ‘z’ and ‘~z’, i.e., Bel({z}) and Bel({~z}), are respectively 
equal to the normalized m-values, m({z}) and m({~z}). The normalization constant K is defined 
as: 
 K = 1 – mZ←ABC(∅), (13) 
Using (9) and (13), one can obtain the following expression for K: 
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Using the definitions of BelZ←ABC({z}) and BelZ←ABC({~z}), and (10)-(12) and (14), we 
obtain the following expressions for the beliefs: 
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Θ )/K, (16) 
By definition, the plausibility in ‘z’ is given by PlZ←ABC(z) = 1 − BelZ←ABC(~z), which 
yields the following expression:  






Θ )/K.  (17) 
The plausibility in ‘~z’ is expressed as: 






































+ )]/K (18) 
Since the plausibilities in ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are defined as: PlA(a) = ( Am
+ + Am
Θ ), PlB(b) = 
( Bm
+ + Bm
Θ ), and PlC(c) = ( Cm
+ + Cm
Θ ), we obtain from (18): 
PlZ←ABC({z}) = PlA(a)PlB(b)PlC(c)/K. (19) 
Discussion of Theorem 1 Results 
The results of Theorem 1 are comprehensible. For example, the conflict term, 
mZ←ABC(∅) in (9) consists of 12 components. The first six components arise from situations 
where one variable has non-zero m-values on its frame; the second variable has non-zero m-
values in its support; and the third variable has a non-zero m-value for its negation, hence the 
conflict. The conflict is clear in the other six components also. Three components are such that 
two variables have non-zero m-values in their support and the third has an m-value for its 
negation, while in the case of other three components, one variable has a non-zero m-value in its 
support and the other two have non-zero m-values against them being true. 
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  The belief in ‘~z’, i.e., BelZ←ABC(~z), also is comprehensible. Since the three variables, 
A, B and C, are related to variable Z through a logical ‘AND’, one expects ‘~z’ to be true when 
‘~a’ is true, or ‘~b’ is true, or ‘~c’ is true. In probability framework, one can write this as: 
P(~z) = P(~a or ~b or ~c) = 1 – P(a)P(b)P(c) = 1 – (1−P(~a))(1−P(~b))(1−P(~c)), 
which is equivalent to Bel({~z}) = 1– (1−m({~a}))(1−m({~b}))(1−m({~c}))/K in (16). This 
reasoning also supports the formula for plausibility in ‘z’ as the product of three plausibilities, 
PlA(a), PlB(b), and PlC(c) in (19). As discussed later, plausibility Pl(z) determines the risk 
associated with Z that it is true, even though there may not be any belief that Z is true [32]. 
The expressions in Equations (15), (16), and (19) are important results. As shown in the 
application section, these expressions can be used to model risks and beliefs in the following 
situations. 1) The belief and plausibility that fraud exists in a financial audit, 2) the belief and 
plausibility that the auditor is not independent from an audit client, and 3) the belief and 
plausibility that the internal audit function does not produce high quality work. In the rest of this 
section, we discuss special cases of Theorem 1. 
Special Cases 
 
Case 1. No Interrelationships, i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 0 
Here we discuss a case where all the interrelationships among the three variables, A, B 
and C are assumed not to exist, i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 0. First, we express the beliefs in ‘z’ and ‘~z’ in 
terms of Corollary 1 given below and then discuss the results. 
Corollary 1:  For r1 = r2 = r3 = 0, the beliefs propagated to Z from variables A, B and C are 
given by the following formulas given that variable Z is related to variables, A, B 
and C, through the logical relationship ‘AND’: 





+ , (20) 
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Θ ), (21) 
Proof of Corollary 1: See Appendix B 
Equations (20)-(21) are a special case of Equations (15) and (16), where there are no 
interrelationships among the variables A, B and C, (i.e.,  r1 = r2 =  r3 = 0). It can be seen from 
(14) that the normalization constant K, reduces to 1 under this condition and the expressions for 
beliefs in (15) and (16) reduce to (20) and (21), respectively. From (20), one can write the belief 
in ‘~z’ that it is true in the following form:4 
BelZ←ABC({~z}) = 1 – (1−ΒelA({~a}))(1−ΒelB({~b}))(1−ΒelC({~c})).  
The above relationship is intuitive and as discussed earlier, is equivalent to the following 
relationship among the variables under the probability framework: 
P(~z) = P(~a or ~b or ~c) = 1 – P(a)P(b)P(c) =  1 – (1−P(~a))(1−P(~b))(1−P(~c)).  
The belief that ‘z’ is true, i.e., BelZ←ABC({z}) is non-zero, results only under the condition 
that Am
+ , Bm
+ , and Cm
+  are non-zero simultaneously. This is an intuitive result. Since A, B and C 
are related to Z through the logical ‘AND’, ‘z’ is true under only one condition that ‘a’, ‘b’, and 
‘c’ are true at the same time. This means that the belief that ‘z’ is true is equal to the product of 
the three beliefs, BelA({a}), BelB({b}) and BelC({c}). However, as one can see from (15), if the 
interrelationships are non-zero, then BelZ←ABC({z}) is non-zero even if only one variable has a 
non-zero ..m
+ . This result has practical implications, as we will show in the next section. For 
example, it is argued and supported empirically [3, 11] that the presence of the following three 
factors: Incentive, Attitude, and Opportunity, must exist for management to commit fraud. 
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However, under strong interrelationships among the three factors, even if only one factor is 
present, the belief that fraud may exist can be high. 
Case 2. All Interrelationships are of the Same Strength 
Here we assume that r1 = r2 = r3 = r. For this case the normalization constant K, and the 
beliefs propagated to Z from variables A, B and C are given by the following expressions using 
(14)-(16): 
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+ )]/K, (23) 
 BelZ←ABC({~z}) = 1 – ( Am
+ + Am
Θ )( B Bm m
+ Θ+ )( Cm
+ + Cm
Θ )/K,. (24) 
From (22) we can see that the normalization constant K starts with a value of 1 at r = 0, 
decreases as r increases, and is smallest at r =1. However, if we choose any two variables, say B 
and C, to have no knowledge about their presence or absence, i.e.,  Bm
Θ =1 and Cm
Θ =1, then the 
normalization constant K equals 1 for all values of r, and the beliefs reduce to: 
 BelZ←ABC({z}) = r
2(3 – 2r) Am
+ , and BelZ←ABC({~z}) = Am
− . 
This is an interesting result. Usually, under an ‘AND’ relationship and in the absence of any 
interrelationships (i.e., r = 0), when Bm
+ = 0, and Cm
+ = 0, one expects BelZ←ABC({z}) = 0, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Since A A(m m )
+ Θ+ = 1 − Am
− = 1 − BelA({~a}), B B(m m )
+ Θ+ = 1 − Bm
− = 1 − BelB({~b}), 
C C(m m )
+ Θ+ =  1 − Cm
− = 1 − BelC({~c}), we obtain 
BelZ←ABC({~z}) = 1 − (1 − BelA({~a}))(1 − BelB({~b})) (1 − BelC({~c})). 
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is what we get from the above result. However, if we assume strong interrelationships (say, r = 
1) among the variables A, B and C, BelZ←ABC({z}) = Am
+ , which makes logical sense. Because 
of the strong interrelationship, even though two of the three factors, say B and C, have zero 
belief masses in support of the corresponding variables, the belief in ‘z’ is simply equal to the m-
value for ‘a’. This result has important practical implications in assessing fraud risk as we show 
in the next section. 
Let us consider another situation where we have no knowledge about the presence or 
absence of just one variable, say C, i.e., Cm
Θ = 1. The normalization constant K, and the beliefs 
are given by the following expressions (see (22) – (24)): 
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Θ )/K. (27) 
 
Equations (26) and (27) again show that if the interrelationships are non-zero, even if we 
have no information about the presence or absence of one of the variables, but do have beliefs 
about the presence or absence of the other two variables, a non-zero belief for ‘z’ is provided 
because of the interrelationships.  
Case 3. No Knowledge about the Presence of All the Three Factors but Partial Knowledge 
About Their Absence 
In this case, we assume that we have no belief that the three factors A, B and C are 
present, i.e., A B Cm  m  m 0
+ + += = = , and Am
− , Bm
−  and Cm
−  are greater than zero. For these values, 
there is no conflict and thus, the renormalization constant K in (14) becomes 1 for any strength 
of the interrelationships and the beliefs and plausibilities for Z from (15) and (16) reduce to: 





 PlZ←ABC({z}) = (1− Am
− )(1− Bm
− )(1− Cm
− ) = Pl({a})Pl({b})Pl({c}), and PlZ←ABC({~z}) = 1. 
Again, the above results make intuitive sense. Since the mass values in support of all the 
three factors are zero, the m-value for ‘z’ is zero also even if the interrelationships are strongest, 
i.e., all r’s = 1. The plausibility that Z is true is simply a product of three plausibilities for ‘a’, ‘b’ 
and ‘c’. Such a result is of a great value to the auditor because of its simplicity, especially when 
the auditor is planning an audit where fraud is suspected as briefly discussed in the next section. 
Case 4. No Information on One Variable and No Relationship with the Other Two Variables 
 For this case, let us assume that we do not have any information on variable B, i.e., Bm
Θ  
= 1, and also assume that there is no relationship between variables A and B, or between B and 
C, i.e., r1= r2= 0. Substituting the above values in (14-18), we obtain the following expressions 
for belief and plausibility in z and ~z: 
 BelZ←ABC({z}) = 0, 
BelZ←ABC({~z}) = 1− (1− Am
− )(1− Cm
− )/K, 
 PlZ←ABC({z}) = (1− Am
− )(1− Cm
− )/K = Pl({a})Pl({c})/K, 
PlZ←ABC({~z}) = 1, 
  where K = 1 – r3( Am
+
Cm




The above results are logical. Since we do not have any knowledge about the presence or 
absence of variable B and since there is no relationship between A and B or B and C, knowing 
about the presence or absence of either A or C or both, does not affect B. Thus, the belief in z, 
i.e., BelZ←ABC({z}), should be zero because of the logical ‘AND’ relationship: z = a∧b∧c. This is 
what we get for this case for BelZ←ABC({z}) as shown above. 
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Case 5. No Information on One Variable and No Relationship between the Other Two 
Variables 
For this case, let us assume we have no information on variable B, i.e., BmΘ  = 1, and also 
assume there is no relationship between variables A and C, i.e., r3= 0. Substituting the above 
values in (14-18), we obtain the following expressions for belief and plausibility in z and ~z: 
Z A,B,C 1 2 1 2 A C 1 2 A C A CBel ({ }) = [(r + r  r r )m m  + r r (m m  + m m )]/ Kz
+ + + Θ Θ +
← − , 
BelZ←ABC({~z}) = 1− (1− Am
− )(1− Cm
− )/K, 
PlZ←ABC({z}) = (1− Am
− )(1− Cm
− )/K = Pl({a})Pl({c})/K, 
 PlZ←ABC({~z}) = 1 – 1 2 1 2 A C 1 2 A C A C[(r + r  r r )m m  + r r (m m  + m m )]/ K
+ + + Θ Θ +− , 
  where K = 1 – r1r2( Am
+
Cm




This case is more interesting than the previous case. Since variable B is related to both A 
and C ( r1>0 and r2>0), knowing about the presence or absence of A and C tells us about the 
presence or absence of B. Thus, though we have no direct knowledge about the presence or 
absence of B, the knowledge of the presence or absence of A and C results in a non-zero belief in 
z and/or ~z. In fact, this belief is higher if both r1 and r2 are greater than zero and increases with 
the increase in their strengths.  
Another interesting result is that the conflict term in K arises because of the two-way 
interaction; knowledge about A gives us the knowledge about B through r1 and then tells us 
about C through r2. Similarly, knowledge about C tells us about B through r2 and tells us about A 
thought r1. Thus, even though there is no direct link between A and C (r3= 0) in the present case, 
because of the interrelationships between A and B and between B and C, we have non-zero 
conflict. 
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The above result is of a great significance in assessing fraud risk since all three fraud 
factors, an Incentive to commit fraud (I), an Attitude to commit fraud (D), and the Opportunity to 
commit fraud (O) must be present for management to commit fraud. If one assumes no 
relationship between the two factors (variables) I and O, and there is no knowledge about D 
(management attitude to commit fraud) because of the difficulties in measuring attitude, fraud 
still may be believed to be possible. That is, the belief about the risk of fraud can be greater than 
zero because knowledge that both an incentive and opportunity exist creates a belief that 
management may have an attitude to commit fraud, even through there is no direct knowledge 
about management’s attitude toward fraud.  
IV.  APPLICATIONS 
Here we illustrate three important applications of the general results presented in 
Theorem 1. The main purpose of presenting these applications is to show the importance of the 
general results derived in the present paper. The first application deals with an assessment by the 
external auditor of belief and plausibility that an audit client’s internal audit function is not of 
high enough quality to allow the external auditor to rely on the work of that internal auditor. The 
second application deals with assessing the belief and plausibility that in an audit engagement 
the auditor is not independent of the client. The third application deals with the assessment of 
belief and plausibility that a company’s management may have committed fraud in reporting 
financial results. In addition to using the general results for assessing the above beliefs and 
plausibilities by the auditing profession, regulators such as the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) can assess from a regulator’s perspective the beliefs and plausibilities that 
fraud may exist or that an auditor is not independent in an engagement. 
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1. Application to Internal Audit Function Quality 
The first application of the general results of Theorem 1 deals with the assessment of the 
quality of the internal audit function. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX), requires 
management of publicly-traded companies to document, evaluate, and report on the effectiveness 
of internal controls over financial reporting and that the independent auditor evaluate and opine 
on management’s assessment of such controls. SOX also requires companies covered by the Act 
to maintain an internal audit function. That is, each company must employ non-independent 
internal auditors whose function is the examination and appraisal of both controls and 
performance. This requirement also may increase the independent auditors’ reliance on the work 
of internal auditors when performing an integrated audit now required under Audit Standard No. 
2 [16].  
For independent auditors to rely on work performed by an internal auditor, the 
independent auditor must assess the quality of the internal audit function [16] as to whether it is 
of high quality or not.5 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [16] contends that the 
considerable flexibility that external auditors have in using the work of the internal auditor 
should encourage companies to develop high-quality internal audit functions, especially to 
reduce the cost of documentation and evaluation of internal controls. The external auditor will be 
able to rely more extensively on the internal audit function if they perceive the quality of the 
internal audit function to be high [16].  Even prior to SOX, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 
65 [2] outlined various ways independent auditors could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness 
of an independent audit by relying on the work of internal auditors. 
                                                 
5 We denote the variable that the internal audit function is of high quality by the symbol H and 
the two values by ‘h’ and ‘~’h, respectively, representing that H is true and not true. 
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There is a substantial body of accounting literature that focuses on the external auditor’s 
assessment of the quality of internal audit function [1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27]. The main 
finding of these studies is that the quality of an internal audit function depends on three quality 
factors—Competence (P), Work performance (W), and Internal Auditor Objectivity (J). 
Competence deals with academic and professional qualifications. Work Performance deals with 
the quality of work, such as assessment of internal controls, risk assessment, and substantive 
procedures performed by the internal auditor. The Internal Auditor Objectivity deals with how 
independent internal auditors are in terms of evaluating and reporting weaknesses in the internal 
control systems. The presence of these three factors is found to be essential for the internal audit 
function to be of high quality. The literature also has identified interrelationships among these 
factors6 [7, 10]. Thus, the problem of assessing the quality of internal audit function is similar to 
that of assessing whether fraud is present or that an auditor is not independent.  
The three factors P, W and J, are related to the internal audit function through the logical 
“AND” relationship. The “AND” relationship between the quality of internal audit function and 
the three factors P, W and J implies that h = p∧w∧j, which implies that the quality of the internal 
audit function is high if and only if the internal auditor is competent (p), the internal auditor’s 
work performance is of high quality (w), and the internal auditor is objective (j). Thus, the 
problem of assessing the quality of audit function is equivalent to assessing whether variable Z is 
present in Figure 1, i.e., h = p∧w∧j is equivalent to the relationship z = a∧b∧c (Compare Figure 
2 with Figure 1).  
-----   Figure 2 about here   ----- 
                                                 
6 In prior research, these factors have been assumed to be binary in nature, i.e., whether the 
factor is present or absent, or whether the internal audit function is of high quality (h) or is not of 
high quality (~h). 
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Thus, we can write the belief that the internal audit function is of high quality (h) given 
that we have knowledge about the presence or absence of the factors, Competence (P), Work 
performance (W), and Objectivity (J), in terms mass functions by using (14) and (15) and 
replacing ‘a’ by ‘p’, ‘b’ by ‘w’, and ‘c’ by ‘j’:   






































+ )]/K. (28) 
Where K is defined as: 





















































− ). (29) 
Various m-values and the interrelationships are defined in Table 1. 
Equation (28) is the general expression for the belief that the internal audit function is of 
high quality. If we assume that there is no relationships among the quality factors, i.e., all r’s are 






+ . This implies that the internal audit function will be of high quality under only 
one condition—the internal auditor is competent (i.e., mP(p) ≡ Pm
+ >0), the work performance is 
of high quality (i.e., mW(w) ≡ Wm
+ >0), and the internal auditor is objective ((i.e., mJ(j) ≡ Jm
+ >0). 
Because of the limited space in the current article, we do not discuss various scenarios of (28). 
Interested readers should see Desai et al. [7] who provide a detailed discuss of the assessment of 
the internal audit function under belief function for various scenarios. 
2.  Application to Auditor Independence Impairment 
In this section, we demonstrate the use of the general results of Theorem 1 to assess the 
belief and plausibility that an auditor is not independent from an audit client. For an auditor to be 
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independent, he/she must not exhibit bias favoring the clients representations included in 
financial statements when such representations may not be appropriate under accepted 
accounting rules or governmental regulations. Figure 3 represents a diagram of the variables that 
determine whether auditor is independent (N). This diagram is based on the auditing literature 
(see e.g., [3, 15, 35]) that suggests that an auditor may not be independent if and only if all three 
factors, Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and Opportunity (O) are present. In other words, the auditor 
will not maintain independence if and only if the auditor has an incentive to gain from being not 
independent, has an attitude to be not independent, and has an opportunity to be not independent. 
This relationship can be written as n = i∧d∧o which is equivalent to the relationship z = a∧b∧c 
(Compare Figure 2 with Figure 1).  
-----   Figure 3 about here   ----- 
As we see, Figure 3 is very similar to Figure 2 except that we have two items of evidence 
for each variable I, D and O, whereas we have only one item of evidence for each variable, P, W 
and J, in Figure 2. Of the two items of evidence pertaining to each variable in Figure 3, one 
determines the impact of threats that increase the presence of the corresponding variable and the 
other supports the negation of the related variable. The formulas for beliefs and plausibilities that 
the auditor is independent or not independent can be derived directly from (15)-(18) by 
substituting ‘N’ for ‘Z’, ‘I’ for ‘A’, ‘D’ for ‘B’, and ‘O’ for ‘C’. However, since we have two 
items of evidence for each of the three variables, I, D and O, we first need to determine the total 
belief mass function at each of the variables by combining them using Dempster’s rule. We then 
use (15)-(18) to determine the beliefs and plausibilities as to whether the auditor is independent 
or not. For a detailed discussion, we refer readers to [15]. 
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3. Application to Assessing Belief and Plausibility in Fraud 
As discussed earlier, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
published Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (SAS No. 99) [3] requiring auditors during an audit to assess the risk of fraud in 
financial statements prepared by management. The statement provides a detailed discussion on 
factors that if present may be indicators that fraud is present. These fraud risk factors generally 
are classified into three categories known as fraud triangle factors: Incentive (I), Attitude (D), 
and Opportunity (O). In other words, management may commit fraud in financial statements if 
all of the following three conditions exist: there is an incentive for management to commit fraud, 
management lacks integrity or has an attitude conducive to committing fraud, and there is an 
opportunity to commit fraud. SAS No. 99 also indicates that safeguards may exist that reduce the 
possibility of the presence of the above fraud risk factors and that such safeguards should be 
evaluated as to effectiveness. Figure 4 represents a diagram of the interrelationship of the three 
conditions I, D and O with a fourth variable F, representing the assertion that management fraud 
is present, along with the interrelationships among themselves. 
-----   Figure 4 about here   ----- 
Although SAS No. 99 provides a detailed description of fraud risk factors associated with 
various fraud triangle factors, it does not provide any guidance on how to assess and aggregate 
the impacts of these factors on the presence or absence of fraud. To develop a complete fraud 
risk assessment model as shown in Figure 4, we consider two items of evidence for each fraud 
triangle variable similar to Figure 3 considered for the auditor independence impairment case. 
One item of evidence pertains to fraud risk factors related to the corresponding fraud triangle 
variable. For example, management may have bonus plans and other perquisites tied to financial 
performance. This factor may create an incentive for management to commit fraud. Such pieces 
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of information are treated in our model as one item of evidence as fraud risks pertaining to the 
corresponding variable. In Figure 4, ETI, ETD, and ETO represent evidence about threat factors 
pertaining to incentive (I), attitude (D), and opportunity (O), respectively. The other item of 
evidence depicts preventative controls or safeguards related to the fraud triangle variable. For 
example, the organization may have an active board of directors and an effective audit 
committee to control management behavior related to incentives to commit fraud or there may be 
strong internal accounting controls in place to reduce opportunities for management to commit 
fraud. Such factors can reduce the likelihood of the presence of the corresponding fraud triangle 
variable. In Figure 4, ESI, ESD, and ESO, respectively, represent evidence about safeguard factors 
pertaining to incentive (I), attitude (D), and opportunity (O).  
For the fraud variable (F) we consider three items of evidence. One item of evidence 
represented by EPI is based on prior information known to the auditor. The second item of 
evidence, EOP, depends on traditional, non-fraud-oriented audit procedures termed ‘Other 
Procedures’. The third, EFP, represents any fraud-specific forensic procedures performed by the 
auditor. Each of these items of evidence provides some degree of belief about whether the 
corresponding variable is present or absent.  
Again, we assume that each variable takes two values; the variable is either present or not 
present. For example, F represents the variable that fraud exists in the financial statements and 
‘f’ represents its value that fraud is present and ‘~f’ represents that fraud is not present. As 
discussed earlier, according to SAS No. 99, variable F is related to the three variables, I, D and O 
through a logical ‘AND’ relationship. In other words, fraud is present if and only if all the three 
factors, I, D and O are present, i.e., f = i∧d∧o, or ~f = ~i∨~d∨~o. These relationships are similar 
to the relationships considered in the derivation of the beliefs and plausibilities for variable Z 
propagated from three variables A, B and C in Figure 1. In fact, ‘z’ is equivalent to ‘f’, and ‘a’, 
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‘b’, and ‘c’ are equivalent to ‘i’, ‘d’ and ‘o’, respectively. Thus, we can write the normalized 
mass function propagated from the three variables, I, D and O directly from (9-12) as: 
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Where KF is given below: 
KF = 1− [r2 + r1r3(1− r2)]
+
I D O D Om (m m m m )
− − +Θ +  − [r3 + r1r2(1− r3)]
+
D I O I Om (m m m m )
− − +Θ +  
 − [r1+ r2r3(1− r1)]
+
O I D I Dm (m m m m )
− − +Θ +  − (r1+ r2 −r1r2) I D O I D O(m m m m m m )
− + − + −+ +  
 − (r2+ r3– r2r3) I D O I D O(m m m m m m )
+ − − − ++ + − (r1+ r3 −r1r3) I D O I D O(m m m m m m )
+ + + − −− + . (33) 
Various m-values and the interrelationships are defined in Table 1. 
The relationships r1, r2 and r3, respectively, represent the relationships between Incentives 
(I) and Attitude (D), between Attitude (D) and Opportunities (O), and between Incentive (I) and 
Opportunities (O). As seen in Figure 4, the mass function at each variable, I, D and O, is the 
combination of two mass functions; one from the fraud risk factors, and the other from the 
safeguard factors. Thus, the following expressions define the three mass functions:7 
                                                 
7 We use Dempster’s rule to combine the two sets of mass functions, one from the threat factors 
denoted by mT and the other from the safeguard factors denoted by mS. In general, we assume 
that fraud risk factors may provide non-zero values for m+, m− and mΘ, for the corresponding 
variable. However, for the safeguard factors, we assume that they yield non-zero values for only 
m− and mΘ. In other words, the safeguard factors only negate the presence of the corresponding 














− )/KI,  (34) 




 +Dm = TDm
+ (1− SDm
− )/KD, Dm







− )/KD,  (35) 




 +Om =  TOm
+ (1− SOm
− )/KO, Om











− .  
The three mass functions defined at variable F due to the three items of evidence, EPI, EOP 
and EFP depicted in Figure 4, are represented by mPI({f}), mPI({~f}), mPI({f,~f}); mOP({f}), 
mOP({~f}), mOP({f,~f}); and mFP({f}), mFP({~f}), mFP({f,~f}), respectively. To determine the 
overall belief and plausibility that fraud exists, we combine the four sets of mass functions at 
variable F, three directly defined at F as defined above by mPI, mOP, and mFP, and the fourth 
denoted by mF←IDO, propagated from variables I, D and O, as defined in (30)-(30). We use again 
Dempster’s rule to combine the above four sets of mass functions and obtain the following 
expressions8 for the total belief and total plausibility in fraud (f):  
 BelT({f}) = 1 – [1−mPI({f})][1−mOP({f})][1−mFP({f})][1− mF←IDO({f})]/KT, (37) 
 PlT({f}) = [1−mPI({~f})][1−mOP({~f})][1−mFP({~f})][1−mF←IDO({~f})]/KT. (38) 
The symbol KT is given by:  
 T i i i
i i i
K  = 1 m ({ }) 1 m ({~ }) m ({ , ~ })( ) ( )f f f f− + − −∏ ∏ ∏ , (39) 
where i∈{PI, OP, FP, F←IDO}. 
                                                 
8 For binary variables, Dempster’s rule can be simplified yielding directly the expressions in (37) 
and (38) (see Srivastava [28] for details).  
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The total belief that fraud exists in (37) and the total plausibility of fraud in (38) are of 
interest when investigating fraud. Srivastava and Shafer [32] argue that the plausibility of 
financial statements containing serious misstatements is the appropriate measure of overall audit 
risk. Similar to Srivastava and Shafer, we define the total plausibility of fraud to be the fraud 
risk. Thus, the expression in (38) represents the overall fraud risk after combining all the 
evidence. To express the overall fraud risk formula in (38) in terms of individual risks or 
plausibilities that incentives are present, attitude is present, and opportunities are present, we 
need to make the following simplifications. 






Θ )/KF, which 
by definition equals to PlI(i)PlA(a)PlO(o)/KF. Also, we know from (34)-(36) that there are two 
items of evidence pertaining to each variable I, A and O, and thus the plausibility that each 
variable present is given by the product of two plausibilities that the variable is present, one due 
to the threat factors and other due to the failure of safeguards. In other words,  PlI(i) = 
PlTI(i)PlSI(i)/KI,  PlA(a) = PlTA(a)PlSA(a)/KA, and PlO(o) = PlTO(o)PlSO(o)/KO. In addition, we 
know that 
(1-mPI({~f}))(1-mOP({~f}))(1-mFP({~f}))/KT = PlPI({f})PlOP({f})PlFP({f})/KT. 
Thus, using (38) and the above simplifications, we can express the fraud risk (FR) 
formula in terms of the individual plausibility functions as:  
PI OP FP TI SI TD SD TO SO
T F I D O
Pl ({ })Pl ({ })Pl ({ }) Pl ({ })Pl ({ }) Pl ({ })Pl ({ }) Pl ({ })Pl ({ })]
. . .
K K K K K
FR
f f f i i d d o o
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (40) 
The above expression represents the overall fraud risk given all the evidence in Figure 4. 
Srivastava et al. [31] discuss this risk model in detail and contrast it with a Bayesian-based 
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model to demonstrate the usefulness of the belief function model. We do not plan to discuss all 
the special cases of (40) here; rather we refer readers to Srivastava et al. [31]. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we have derived analytical formulas for the overall beliefs on a binary 
variable Z resulting from beliefs on three binary variables A, B and C that are related to variable 
Z through an ‘AND’ relationship under the assumption that these three variables are interrelated. 
The general results are presented in Theorem 1 along with a special case presented in Corollary 
1. Several other special cases are presented to demonstrate the importance of the results in 
Theorem 1.  
Importantly, under the assumption that there are no interrelationships between the three 
variables, A, B and C, we show that the general formulas (see Corollary 1) reduce to the results 
obtained directly from Proposition 1 of Srivastava et al. [33]. In addition, we demonstrate 
applications of the general formulas in three important areas. 1) assessment of the quality of the 
internal audit function by the external auditor to determine the appropriate level of reliance on 
the work of internal auditor, 2) assessment of the auditor’s independence risk in a financial 
statement audit, and 3) assessment of fraud risk in financial reporting.  
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Appendix A 
Proof of Theorem 1 
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward but computationally very cumbersome. 
Basically, we want to combine seven mass functions as given in (8) and marginalize (see 
footnote 3) the resulting mass function (i.e., m-values) to variable Z. Since the combination of 
mass functions is known to be commutative and associative (see, e.g., Shafer [19]), one can 
chose any order to combine the above mass functions. We chose the following sequence for 
combining the mass functions: 







In other words, we first combine the two mass functions, mAB and mAC, defined in (4) and 
(6), respectively, and denote the resulting mass function by m1, i.e., m1 = (mAB⊕mAC). Next, we 
combine m1 with mBC given in (5) and obtain the following mass function denoted by m2 = (m1⊕ 
mBC) = ((mAB⊕ mAC)⊕mBC). In the third step, we combine m2 with mZABC given in (7) and obtain 
the mass function denoted by m3 = (m2⊕ mZABC) = (((mAB⊕ mAC)⊕mBC)⊕mZABC). In the fourth 
step, we combine m3 with mA given in (1), and marginalize the resulting mass function to the 
frame of ZBC by eliminating variable A. This process yields the following mass function 
denoted by m4 = ((((mAB⊕ mAC)⊕mBC)⊕mZABC)⊕mA)
↓ZBC
. Next, we combine m4 with mB given 
in (2) and marginalize the resulting m-values to the frame of ZC by eliminating variable B. This 
process yields the following mass function: m5 = (m4⊕ mB)
↓ZC
. Finally, we combine m5 with mC 
given in (3) and marginalize the resulting mass function to the frame of Z by eliminating C to 
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obtain the desired result: mZ←ABC = (m5⊕ mC)
↓Z







. These steps are described below in detail. 
Step 1:  
In this step, we want to compute m1 = (mAB⊕ mAC), i.e., combine mAB with mAC. This is 
achieved by first extending mAB and mAC to the frame, ΘABC = {abc, ab~c, a~bc, ~abc, a~b~c, 
~ab~c, ~a~bc, ~a~b~c}, through vacuous extension9 and then combine the two mass functions 
using Dempster’s rule. We obtain the following mass function after extending mAB and mAC onto 
the frame ΘABC: 
 mAB({ab,~a~b}) = mAB({abc, ab~c, ~a~bc, ~a~b~c}) =  r1,  
 mAB({ab, a~b, ~ab, ~a~b}) = mAB(ΘABC) = 1− r1, (A2) 
and 
 mAC({ac,~a~c}) = mAC({abc, a~bc, ~ab~c, ~a~b~c}) =  r3, 
 mAC({ac, a~c, ~ac, ~a~c}) = mAC(ΘABC) = 1− r3. (A3) 
By combining the above m-values, we obtain the following mass function on the frame ΘABC:  
 m1({abc, ~a~b~c}) = r1r3, 
 m1({abc, ab~c, ~a~bc, ~a~b~c}) = r1(1−r3), 
 m1({abc, a~bc, ~ab~c, ~a~b~c}) = (1−r1)r3, 
 m1(ΘABC) = (1−r1)(1−r3). (A4) 
                                                 
9 Vacuous Extension is the process through which a mass function from a smaller node (having 




In this step, we combine m1 defined in (A4) with mBC again by first extending mBC onto 
the frame ΘABC. The vacuous extension of mBC onto ΘABC yields the following mass function: 
 mBC({bc,~b~c}) = mBC({abc,~ abc, a~b~c, ~a~b~c}) =  r2,  
 mBC({bc, b~c, ~bc, ~b~c}) = mBC(ΘABC) = 1− r2, (A5) 
The combination process of the two mass functions, one in (A4) and the other in (A5), yields the 
following mass function on the frame ΘABC: 
 m2({abc, ~a~b~c}) = r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3−2r1r2r3, 
 m2({abc, ab~c, ~a~bc, ~a~b~c}) = r1(1−r2)(1−r3), 
 m2({abc, ~abc, a~b~c, ~a~b~c}) = (1−r1)r2(1−r3), 
 m2({abc, a~bc, ~ab~c, ~a~b~c}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)r3, 
 m2(ΘABC) = (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3). (A6) 
  Step 3: 
In Step 3, we combine the mass function in (A6) with mZABC. This process is straight 
forward because mZABC(ΘZABC) = 1 for ΘZABC = {zabc, ~zab~c, ~za~bc, ~z~abc, ~za~b~c, 
~z~ab~c, ~z~a~bc, ~z~a~b~c}. Combining m2 and mZABC yields the following mass function on 
the frame ΘZABC: 
 m3({zabc ,~z ~a~b~c}) = r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3−2r1r2r3, 
 m3({zabc, ~zab~c, ~z~a~bc, ~z~a~b~c}) = r1(1−r2)(1−r3), 
 m3({zabc, ~z~abc, ~za~b~c, ~z~a~b~c}) = (1−r1)r2(1−r3), 
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 m3({zabc, ~za~bc, ~z~ab~c, ~z~a~b~c}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)r3, 
 m3(ΘZABC) = (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3). (A7) 
Step 4: 
In Step 4, we combine the mass function in (A7) with mA and marginalize the resulting 
mass function to the frame ΘZBC = {zbc, ~zbc, ~zb~c, ~z~bc, ~z~b~c} by eliminating variable A. 
Before we combine mA with m3 in (A7), we vacuously extend mA onto the frame ΘZABC as 
follows:  
 mA({a}) = mA({zabc, ~zab~c, ~za~bc, ~za~b~c}) = Am
+ , 
 mA({~a}) = mA({~z~abc, ~z~ab~c, ~z~a~bc, ~z~a~b~c}) = Am
− , 
 mA({a,~a}) = mA(ΘZABC) = Am
Θ . (A8) 
Since there are five non-zero belief masses for m3 in (A7) and three non-zero belief masses for 
mA in (A8), combining the two mass functions using Dempster’s rule yields fifteen belief masses  
on the frame ΘZABC. However, when these fifteen belief masses are marginalized to the frame 
ΘZBC by eliminating variable A, we obtain the following mass function with twelve belief 
masses: 
 m4({zbc}) = (r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3−2r1r2r3) Am
+  
 m4({~z~b~c}) = (r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3−2r1r2r3) Am
− , 
 m4({zbc,~z~b~c}) = (r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3−2r1r2r3) Am
Θ + (1−r1)r2(1−r3) Am
+  
 m4({zbc, ~zb~c}) = r1(1−r2)(1−r3) Am
+ , 
 m4({~z~bc ,~z~b~c}) =  r1(1−r2)(1−r3) Am
− , 
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 m4({zbc, ~z~bc}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)r3 Am
+ , 
 m4({~zb~c, ~z~b~c}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)r3 Am
− , 
 m4({~zbc, ~z~b~c}) = (1−r1)r2(1−r3) Am
− , 
 m4({zbc, ~zbc, ~z~b~c}) = (1−r1)r2(1−r3) Am
Θ , 
 m4({~zbc, ~zb~c, ~z~bc, ~z~b~c}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3) Am
− , 
 m4({zbc, ~zb~c, ~z~bc, ~z~b~c})=[r1(1−r2)(1−r3)+(1−r1)(1−r2)r3] Am
Θ + (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3) Am
+ , 
 m4({zbc, ~zbc, ~zb~c, ~z~bc, ~z~b~c}) = (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3) Am
Θ . (A9) 
Step 5: 
In this step, we combine the mass function in (A9) with mB and marginalize the resulting 
mass function to the frame ΘZC = {zc, ~zc, ~z~c} by eliminating variable B. In order to combine 
mB with m4, we vacuously extend mB onto the frame ΘZBC = {zbc, ~zbc, ~zb~c, ~z~bc, ~z~b~c} 
as follows:  
 mB({b}) = mB({zbc, ~zbc, ~zb~c}) = Bm
+ , 
 mB({~b}) = mB({~z~bc, ~z~b~c}) = Bm
− , 
 mB({b,~b}) = mB(ΘZBC) = Bm
Θ . (A10) 
Combining mB in (A10) with m4 in (A9) using Dempster’s rule10 yields 36 belief masses, 
which is the result of multiplying 12 belief masses in (A9) with three belief masses in (A10). 
However, out of 36 belief masses, 32 are defined over the frame ΘZBC = {zbc, ~zbc, ~zb~c, 
~z~bc,~z~b~c} and four pertain to the empty set representing the conflicts among the two mass 
                                                 
10 We do not re-normalize the m-values at this stage. This is done at the end after combining all 
the m-values. 
 38
functions denoted by m5(∅). Next, we marginalize the above 32 belief masses to the frame ΘZC = 
{zc, ~zc, ~z~c} by eliminating variable B. This process yields the following mass function: 
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 m5(~zc) = (1−r1)(1−r2)r3 Am
+
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+
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 + (1−r1)(1−r2)(1−r3)( Am
Θ
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+  + Am
+
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Θ ).  
 m5(∅) =  (r1 + r2r3 − r1r2r3)( Am
+
Bm
−  + Am
−
Bm
+ ) (A11) 
Step 6: 
In Step 6, we combine the mass function in (A11) with mC and marginalize the resulting 
mass function to the frame ΘZ = {z, ~z} by eliminating variable C. Here again, in order to 
combine mC with m5 in (A11), we vacuously extend mC onto the frame ΘZC = {zc, ~zc,~z~c} as 
follows:  
 mC({c}) = mC({zc, ~zc}) = Cm
+ , 
 mc({~c}) = mC({~z~c}) = Cm
− , 
 39
 mc({c,~c}) = mC(ΘZC) = Cm
Θ . (A12) 
Combining mC in (A12) with m5 in (A11) using Dempster’s rule yields 24 belief masses. 
Seven out of twenty-four belief masses pertain to the empty set or the conflict. The 
marginalization process of the above 24 m-values onto the frame ΘZ = {z, ~z} by eliminating 
variable C, yields the following mass function11 along with the conflict term denoted by m6(∅):  
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+ ). (A13) 
The above mass function is not normalized and represents the desired result at variable Z, 
which we express as mZ←ABC, the mass function propagated from the variables A, B, and C to Z. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Corollary 1 
By definition, the beliefs in ‘z’ and in ‘~z’ are equal to m-values for ‘z’ and ‘~z’, 
respectively. These m-values can be obtained directly from Proposition 1 of Srivastava et al. 
[33]. Their Proposition 1 provides formulas to combine m-values propagated from sub-
objectives to the main objective in an ‘AND’ tree. This situation is equivalent to our situation 
where Z is related to three variables, A, B and C, through the logical ‘AND’, i.e., z = a∧b∧c. 
Their Proposition 1 states that “The resultant m-values propagated from n sub-objectives (Oi, i = 





X all O's i
i=1




X all O's i
i=1
om (~ ) = 1- [1- m (~ )]ox← ∏ , 
and 
 mX←all O’s({x, ~x}) = 1 – mX←all O’s(x) – mX←all O’s(~x). 
In the present case, we have three sub-objectives, A, B, and C, with Z being the main 
objective and thus, x, is z, and oi’s are a, b and c. The above formulas yield the following m-
values for our case: 





+ , (B1) 
 mZ←ABC(~z) = 1–(1-mA(~a)) (1-mB(~b))(1- mC(~c))  






Θ ), (B2) 
These m-values yield: 




Θ )( C Cm  + m
+ Θ ) (B3)  
 BelZ←ABC(z) = A B Cm m m
+ + +  (B4) 
These are exactly the same beliefs given in Equations (20) and (21). Q.E.D.  
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* A rounded box represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence, and a 
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Figure 2:  Diagram Representing Network of Variables for Internal Audit Function 


















* Similar to Figures 2 and 3, a rounded box here represents a variable, a rectangle represents an 
item of evidence, and a hexagonal box represents a relationship. These relationships are defined 
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Figure 3:  Diagram Representing Network of Variables for Auditor Independence Risk with 


















* A rounded box represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence, and a 
hexagonal box represents a relationship. These relationships are defined in Table 1 similar to the 
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* A rounded box represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence, and a 
hexagonal box represents a relationship. These relationships are defined in Table 1 similar to the 
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Table 1: List of Symbols and Their Descriptions 
Symbol Description 
General Analytical Formula 
Z {z,~z} Binary variable Z that is related to three binary variables, A, B and C, through the logical 
relationship ‘AND’ where z and ~z represent that Z is true and not true, respectively. 
A {a,~a} Binary variable A where a and ~a represent that A is true and not true, respectively. 
B {b,~b} Binary variable B where b and ~b represent that B is true and not true, respectively. 







 denotes the relational node between A and B and r
1







 denotes the relational node between B and C and r
2







 denotes the relational node between A and C and r
3
 represents its strength 
..m (..)  
The basic belief mass (m-value) for the value of the variable in the parenthesis from the 
evidence represented by the subscript. 
Θ .. 
This symbol represents the frame of a variable denoted by the subscript. For example, 
the frame of variable ‘A’ is represented as AΘ = {a, ~a}. 
+ + +
A B Cm ,  m  and m  
m-values supporting the presence of the factors A, B and C, respectively.  
A B Cm ,  m  and m
− − −  m-values negating the presence of the factors A, B and C, respectively. 
A B Cm ,  m  and m
Θ Θ Θ  m-values representing the basic beliefs on the entire frame of the variables represented by the sub-script. 
Bel..(..) The belief that the argument in the parenthesis is true  
Pl..(..) The plausibility that the argument in the parenthesis is true. 
K A normalization constant 
Bel
Z←ABC
({z}) The belief that Z is true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been propagated 
to Z and combined.  
Bel
Z←ABC
({~z}) The belief that Z is not true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been 
propagated to Z and combined. 
Pl
Z←ABC
({z}) The plausibility that Z is true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been 
propagated to Z and combined. 
Pl
Z←ABC
({~z}) The plausibility that Z is not true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been 
propagated to Z and combined. 
Application to Assessing Belief and Plausibility in Fraud  
F {f,~f} F represents the variable ‘Fraud’. Values  f and ~f represent that F is true, and not true, 
respectively. In other words, ‘f’ represents that fraud is present and ‘~f ’that fraud is not 
present. 
I {i,~i} I represents the variable ‘Incentive’. Values i and ~i represent that I is true and not true, 
respectively. In other words, i represents that there is an incentive and ~i represents that 
there is no incentive. 
D {d,~d} D represents the variable ‘Attitude’. Values d and ~d represent that D is true and not 
true, respectively. In other words, d represents that management’s attitude rationalizes 
the commitment of fraud, and ~d the opposite of d. 
O {o,~o} O represents the variable ‘Opportunity’. Values o and ~o represent that O is true and not 
true, respectively. In other words, o represents that there is an opportunity and ~o 
represents that there is no opportunity. 
+ + +
I D Om , m , m  m-values supporting the presence of the factors I, D and O, respectively.  
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I D Om , m , m
− − −  m-values negating the presence of the factors I, D and O, respectively. 
I D Om ,  m ,  and m
Θ Θ Θ  m-values representing the basic beliefs on the entire frame of the variables represented by the sub-script. 
ETI, ETD, ETO Evidence about threat factors pertaining to Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and Opportunity 
(O) 
ESI, ESD, ESO Evidence about safeguard factors pertaining to Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and 
Opportunity (O) 
EPI Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not based on prior information (PI), 
EFP Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not obtained from forensic procedures 
EOP Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not from procedures other than 
forensic procedures 
PlPI(f), PlFP(f), PlOP(f) Plausibility of fraud based on prior information (PI), evidence from forensic procedures 
(FP), and evidence from other procedures (OP), respectively 
PlTI(i), PlTD(d), PlTO(o) The plausibility that an incentive exists (i), management may have an attitude (d) 
rationalizing fraud, and opportunities exist (o) because of the corresponding threat 
factors. 
PlSI(i), PlSD(d), PlSO(o) The plausibility that an incentive exists (i), management may have an attitude (d) 
rationalizing fraud, and opportunities exist (o) because of ineffective safeguards. 
KT, KF, KI, KD, KO, Normalization constants 
Application to Auditor Independence Impairment 
N {n,~n} N represents the variable ‘Independence Risk’. Values  n and ~n represent that N is true, 
and not true, respectively. In other words, n represents that independence has been 
impaired and ‘~n ’that independence has not been impaired. 
I {i,~i} I represents the variable ‘Incentive’. Values i and ~i represent that I is true and not true, 
respectively. In other words, i represents that a threat to independence exists in the form 
of an incentive and ~i represents that there is no threat. 
D {d,~d} D represents the variable ‘Attitude’. Values d and ~d represent that D is true and not 
true, respectively. In other words, d represents that the auditor’s attitude rationalizes the 
impairment of independence, and ~d the opposite of d. 
O {o,~o} O represents the variable ‘Opportunity’. Values o and ~o represent that O is true and not 
true, respectively. In other words, o represents that a threat to independence exists in the 
form of an opportunity and ~o represents that there is no opportunity. 
Application to Internal Audit Function Quality 
H {h,~h} H represents the quality of the internal audit function. Values  h and ~h represent that H 
is true, and not true, respectively. In other words, h represents that the quality of the 
internal audit function is high and ~h  that quality is low. 
P {p,~p} P represents the variable ‘Competence’. Values p and ~p represent that P is true and not 
true, respectively. In other words, p represents that the internal auditor is competent and 
~p represents that the auditor is not competent. 
W {w,~w} W represents the variable ‘Work Performance’. Values w and ~w represent that W is true 
and not true, respectively. In other words, w represents that the work performance of the 
auditor is high and ~w represents that the work performance is low. 
J {j,~j} J represents the variable ‘Internal Auditor Objectivity’. Values j and ~j represent that J is 
true and not true, respectively. In other words, j represents that the internal auditor is 
objective and ~j represents that the auditor is not objective. 
 
